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Abstract 
The new context of coalition government and the ‘Big Society’ suggests that the UK 
government is moving towards a style of politics followed successfully in Scotland, 
extending a partnership approach from national to local forms of government.  Yet, the two 
arenas have never been as far apart as is commonly imagined.  The majoritarian (UK) and 
consensus (Scottish) labels are misleading.  British politics
i
 is not as exceptional as it is often 
made out to be, while Scottish politics retains many elements of its British counterpart.  This 
article assesses the state of British politics in this light.  It sets out a counter-exceptionalism 
thesis based on the theory and evidence from public policy.  It then summarises the post-
devolution evidence, producing insights on the British policy style when compared to the 
‘new politics’ in Scotland.1   
Introduction 
It is too easy to present the British political tradition as exceptional or unusual based on a 
simple caricature: it preserves representative over other forms of democracy; is a majoritarian 
system with a concentration of power; its leaders are presidential; its politics are adversarial; 
policymaking is top-down without due consultation; departments are hierarchical and run by 
command and control; and so on.  The aim of this article is not to reject this caricature out of 
hand (since it is possible to confirm elements of it in particular circumstances).  Rather, it 
rejects its use as shorthand; as something whose pervasiveness is asserted much more than it 
is demonstrated.  It argues that most of the more convincing literature does its best to present 
a different way to understand British politics.  This literature has two forms.  Public policy 
theory identifies elements of policymaking that transcend political systems and qualify the 
idea that some are unique.  For example, all political systems contain boundedly rational 
decision makers and policymaker attention lurches from issue to issue in all systems because 
no actor has the ability to consider all issues.   Similarly, no core executive has the ability to 
control all aspects of the policy process.  Instead, they devolve most decision making to 
lower levels within (and, perhaps increasingly, outwith) the government machine.  The 
empirical material often investigates the idea of British peculiarity and finds that the evidence 
does not match the rhetoric; British governments operate in much the same way as their 
European counterparts  This approach flourished with the study of policy communities and 
networks (and implementation) and continued with the current focus on governance – work 
that points to a considerable diffusion of power, and a debatable amount of central 
government control of the policy process, within the British system.     
Yet, the caricature is still alive and well (most notably in Lijphart, 1999), existing as a 
shorthand way to compare a UK majoritarian system with political systems less prone to its 
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top-down and competitive excesses.  The main consequence of this caricature is a skewed 
understanding of the British policy style (often defined simply as the way that governments 
make and implement policy - Richardson, 1982: 2).  We focus too much on limited examples 
of centralisation without considering the analytical consequences.  We confirm that core 
executives are important by focusing on what they are doing rather than what they cannot do 
as a result.   Rose’s (1986) famous motto is that if policymakers pay attention to one issue 
they must, by necessity, ignore at least 99 others.  Consequently, when we focus on instances 
in which ministers pays a disproportionate amount of time and energy internalising a single 
issue, we ignore the fact that the bulk of her/ his remaining responsibilities carry on without 
top-level involvement.  This universal constraint to policymaking is what brings different 
political systems together.  It also provides an element of continuity in our study of British 
politics over time – the people may change, and their attention may lurch to different issues, 
but the same basic processes and constraints endure.  To paraphrase Rose (1984; 1990), 
parties and governments make a difference, but they also inherit massive commitments.  
They reject or amend some of those commitments, but they accept and deliver on most.  This 
is no more or less true in the UK.   
This article explores these points in a comparison of British and Scottish politics within the 
context of apparently competing political traditions.  The so-called ‘architects of devolution’ 
(McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 14) are perhaps the guiltiest of perpetuating a caricature of 
the British political tradition to present devolution in the most positive light.  The argument is 
that a, “‘top-down’ system, in which power is concentrated within government, is not 
appropriate for a Scottish system with a tradition of civic democracy and the diffusion of 
power” (2008: 12). A proportional electoral system with a strong likelihood of bargaining 
between parties would replace a plurality system that exaggerates majorities and produces 
one party dominance.  A consensual style of politics would replace the adversarial style in 
Parliament.  Power sharing with the Scottish Parliament would replace executive dominance, 
particularly under periods of minority government.  There would be more consultation 
beyond the ‘usual suspects’ and ‘the people’ would get more chance to contribute to the 
political process (2008: 11-2).   Indeed, this might even solve problems related to governance 
(defined in this case as a loss of central control of the direction of policy): more consultation 
means greater group ownership of policies and fewer problems of implementation; while, a 
departure from command-and-control and policy driven by targets will produce fewer 
unintended consequences (Cairney, 2009a: 6-7).  Overall, the shift from old Westminster to 
the new Scottish Parliament (as one of the newest ‘consensus democracies’) would produce a 
more consensual political system with fewer problems of government. 
A decade of evidence suggests that these claims were largely misleading.  Coalition and 
minority government is the norm, but the electoral system has not produced a remarkably 
different type of consensus politics.  Or, at least, ‘consensus’ is difficult to observe and pin 
down (is this really what it looks like?).  While there is some evidence of parliamentary 
influence, the executive-legislative relationship is firmly in the Westminster mould (indeed, 
there is little evidence to suggest that its influence is any greater than Westminster’s).   While 
the Scottish Government consults widely, so too does the UK government (Cairney, 2008).  
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While the Scottish Government has a more traditional relationship with service delivery 
organisations (appearing to rely more on local government and less on alternative service 
delivery), it does not have fewer problems of governance (Cairney, 2009a).  Overall, the 
differences in the two systems are not nearly as stark as the majoritarian/ consensus 
distinction suggests.  Instead, both systems are bound by common logics related to the role of 
the executive and the need to engage in policymaking that is largely incremental and based 
on close relationships with pressure participants (a point first made to identify a common 
European policy style – Richardson, 1982).    
In other words, the new context of coalition government and the ‘Big Society’ suggests that 
the UK government is moving towards a style of politics developed successfully in Scotland, 
extending a partnership approach from national to local forms of government.  Yet, the two 
arenas are not as far apart as is commonly imagined.  The aim of this article is to assess the 
state of British politics in this light.  It sets out a counter-exceptionalism thesis based on the 
theory and evidence from public policy.  It then summarises the post-devolution evidence, 
producing further insights on the British policy style when compared to the ‘new politics’ in 
Scotland.  Finally, it considers lessons that the UK can learn from its Scottish counterpart.  
The advantage to the argument presented in this article is that, if the systems are as directly 
comparable as I suggest, then the lessons from one system to another are highly relevant and 
adaptable.  This can relate to practical issues on the potential for successful coalition 
government (see Cairney, 2011a) and the role of social partnerships.  It can also reinforce a 
particular analytical approach to the study of British politics in the near future.  There was a 
tendency in Scotland to treat 1999 as ‘year zero’, suggesting that only the future mattered and 
that radical change was definitely afoot, ‘often reflecting hopes and aspirations over serious 
analysis’ (Mitchell, 2006).  While there may be less hope in the UK context, there is still the 
same need for an understanding on the continuities of policymaking as well as its novelty in 
the Cameron/ Clegg era.   
UK Majoritarianism versus the European and Devolved Policy Styles  
Let us consider two contrasting ideas regarding the UK as a political system.  The first, 
expounded most famously by Lijphart (1999), is that the UK’s majoritarian system is almost 
the polar opposite of the consensus democracies to be found in many Nordic countries, 
Switzerland, Belgium, and others (plus the EU political system).  The second is the argument 
in Richardson’s (1982) edited volume that the UK shares a common policy style with its 
consensus democracy counterparts.  Our concern is how best to characterise the British policy 
style: with reference to a ‘majoritarian’ government that exploits the centralisation of power 
to impose policy decisions without consultation, or to the diffusion of power across policy 
sectors and relatively consensual relationships between groups and government.  While the 
latter has been accepted within much of the British public policy literature (albeit with some 
heated debates about the extent of power diffusion), the former still has a strong hold in 
comparative politics.  
Lijphart’s (1999) narrative suggests that policy styles flow from electoral systems and the 
distribution of power. He sets up a simple distinction between policy styles in countries 
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which use plurality and proportional electoral systems: the former exaggerates governing 
majorities, produces a concentration of power at the centre and encourages majoritarian, top-
down government; the latter diffuses power and encourages the formation of coalitions and 
the pursuit of consensus.  Under proportional systems, power is dispersed across parties, 
encouraging the formation of coalitions based on common aims. This spirit of ‘inclusiveness, 
bargaining and compromise’ extends to the relationships between group and government, 
with groups more likely to cooperate with each other and governments more willing to form 
corporatist alliances (Lijphart, 1999: 2-3). In contrast, the plurality system exaggerates 
governing majorities; control of the legislature is held by a single party and power is 
concentrated within government. This asymmetry of power extends to the group-government 
arena, with groups more likely to compete with each other and governments more likely to 
impose policy from the top down.  This picture of UK politics is very much in keeping with 
the ‘British political tradition’ highlighted by most papers in this volume.    
The frustration for colleagues such as Grant Jordan (in correspondence) is that Lijphart’s 
argument has been restated following two decades of ‘policy communities’ work (starting 
with Richardson and Jordan, 1979) that challenges the majoritarian UK caricature.  
Richardson et al’s (1982) argument is that different political systems enjoy similar policy 
styles. Most (Western European) countries share a common ‘standard operating procedure’ 
based on two factors: a generally incremental approach to policy (radical departures from 
policy decisions negotiated in the past are rare) and an attempt to reach consensus with 
interest groups rather than impose decisions. These governments face the same basic 
constraints.   First, the size of the state, and scope for ‘overload’, necessitates breaking policy 
down into more manageable sectors and sub-sectors.  Power is effectively spread across 
government because the more specialised subsectors are less subject to top-down control. 
Ministers and senior civil servants devolve the bulk of decision-making to less senior 
officials who share power with interest groups when they exchange access for resources such 
as expertise.  Second, the logic underpinning ‘bureaucratic accommodation’ of the most 
affected interests is strong since it encourages group ownership of policy and maximises 
governmental knowledge of possible problems.  This ‘logic of consultation’ (Jordan and 
Maloney, 1997) often produces stable arrangements within policy communities (which are 
now generally described as close-knit policy networks). 
The latter picture does not preclude the identification of top-down forms of policymaking 
when, for example, parties have non-negotiable manifesto commitments or senior ministers 
compete to dominate high profile decisions (Jordan and Richardson, 1982: 98).  Rather, it 
produces the call for more evidence on, rather than assumptions about, the most common 
British policy style (Cairney, 2008: 354).  In short, we need to look beyond the headlines 
related to ‘spectacular’ ministerial activity to identify the more humdrum day-to-day 
decisions being taken in less visible and less contentious arenas (Richardson, 1982: 199). 
This concern became particularly important during a Thatcher era that was widely assumed to 
be marked by conviction politics (fostered by a majoritarian system), the rejection of 
consultation and the imposition of policy (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 8).  Subsequent debates 
on the nature of consultation demonstrated that the British policy style was complex and 
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varied over time, sector and issue.  Although consultation appeared to be rejected at a 
ministerial level, it was often merely displaced to other parts of the government machine 
(Cairney, 2002).  There were still close relationships between groups and government and a 
top-down process only accounted for a small proportion of the British style.  These points 
were reinforced in the  literature that critiqued discussions of Blair’s ‘Presidentialism’ (see 
for example Bevir and Rhodes, 2006) and suggested, in a direct qualification of Lijphart 
(1999), that the formal concentration of power in Britain tends to be used, ‘with a certain 
informal restraint’ (Adam and Kriesi, 2007, 140).  Kriesi, Adam and Jochum’s (2006: 357-8) 
empirical study suggests that UK policy networks do not live up to their majoritarian 
reputation: ‘British policy networks turned out to be quite fragmented, resembling more 
closely those expected for consensus than for majoritarian democracies … This implies that 
future research should no longer aim at national level generalizations about power 
configurations and policy processes’.   
Overall, the policy communities approach suggests that we cannot read off behaviour simply 
from formal institutions, or expect to make concrete conclusions based on an appeal to 
political traditions.  This approach enjoys a close relationship with the broader public policy 
literature that identifies factors which transcend political systems and traditions.  For 
example, punctuated equilibrium theory (the version associated with Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993; 2009, not new institutionalism) and incrementalism both draw on the classic focus on 
comprehensive rationality.  Comprehensive rationality represents an ‘ideal’ description of the 
power of a central decision-maker to research and articulate a series of consistent policy aims 
and then make sure that they are carried out. The point is that the assumptions necessary to 
demonstrate this power – that organisations can analyse information comprehensively, 
separate values from facts, rank policy preferences and make policy in a linear fashion – are 
unrealistic.  Therefore, models of the policy process seek to describe what happens when 
these assumptions are relaxed or rejected: the search for knowledge is limited by capacity and 
ideology; problem definition is determined by both facts and values; policy makers have 
multiple, and often unclear, objectives which are difficult to rank in any meaningful way; 
and, the policy process is difficult to separate into stages and may not be linear (Cairney, 
2011b).   Most employ Simon’s (1976: xxviii) term ‘bounded rationality’ which suggests that 
policymakers and organisations ‘satisfice’ rather than maximise their utility, and use simple 
rules of thumb to address the fact that they cannot research and consider the effects of all 
options.   
Punctuated equilibrium theory considers the effect of bounded rationality on agenda setting.  
Since decision makers, the media and the public all have limited resources (time, knowledge, 
attention) they cannot deal with the full range of policy problems.  So, they ignore most and 
promote few to the top of their agenda.  This explains the existence and breakdown of policy 
communities.  Issues are framed in a particular way (for example as humdrum or technical 
because the fundamental issue has been solved) to limit the number of participants who can 
claim a legitimate role.   Those excluded from communities have an interest in challenging 
this image.  The role of knowledge and new evidence becomes crucial to divert attention to 
other aspects of the same problem.  If a new and competing image is stifled by policy 
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communities, then groups pursue ‘aggressive venue-shopping’ to seek influential and 
receptive audiences elsewhere (the courts, other types of government, the media, and the 
public).  In some cases this is successful and we witness a shift from negative to positive 
feedback (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005).  Periods of negative feedback are defined by 
limited government attention; policymakers will ignore or be resistant to new information 
gathered from the experience of other countries.  In periods of positive feedback, those ideas 
may be given disproportionate attention by policymakers focussed acutely on one issue at the 
expense of most others.  Given the limited attention spans of ministers and governments, the 
consequence of intense levels of attention to one idea (which may produce policy 
punctuations) is that most ideas with the potential to destabilise existing policy arrangements 
are ignored.  These conditions transcend political systems and endure over time. 
Second, the UK may be no less subject to incrementalism than other countries.  Many 
commentators from other countries have identified the UK as an inspirational system that is 
not subject to the same incremental processes (see Hayes, 2001: 2 on the US, Krauss and 
Pekkanen, 2004 on Japan, Fabrini and Gilbert, 2000: 28 on Italy and Kitschelt and Streeck, 
2003: 2 on Germany).  Yet, most aspects of incrementalism do not relate specifically to 
political systems.  Rather, they relate as much to the limited information and cognitive 
abilities of policymakers and the need to build on past policies.  Top-down decision making 
is often ‘politically expensive’ (Richardson et al, 1982: 10).  It is also cognitively expensive 
and a drain on the resources of time-constrained policymakers.  Simply put, they can only 
ride roughshod over so many existing commitments.   
The list of conditions that transcend systems goes on.  The UK is as subject to inertia as most 
other systems.  While majoritarianism may be associated with the ability to change policy 
quickly from the top-down, the evidence for this is not persuasive.  Rather, Rose (1990; Rose 
and Davies, 1994) highlights the effect of decades of cumulative policies; newly elected 
policymakers inherit a huge government with massive commitments.  Since governments are 
more likely to introduce new than terminate old policies, the cumulative effect is profound.   
Similarly, Hogwood and Peters (1983) argue that the size and scope of the state is such that 
any ‘new’ policy is likely to be a revision of an old one following policy failure.  Policy 
succession is more likely than innovation because the issue already has legitimacy, the 
resources for a service delivery institution exist and policy has an established clientele. More 
significant innovations require policy termination to reduce costs before committing new 
resources.  Yet, complete termination also has immediate costs, may smack of failure without 
direct replacement, may be opposed by groups associated with the policy, and may be 
undermined by organisations operating in relative anonymity (if policy is ‘technical’ or 
obscure) or seeking new ways to justify their existence.  Policymaking may be more about 
dealing with the legacies of past decisions than departing incrementally from them. 
The same can be said for discussions of rationality and governance.  Studies of multi-level 
governance suggest that large fragmented governments lack a powerful ‘centre’: ‘No single 
actor has all knowledge and information required to solve complex, dynamic and diversified 
problems, no actor has sufficient overview to make the application of needed instruments 
effective, no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular 
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governing model’ (Kooiman, 1993: 4).  Rather, policy outcomes result from the complex 
interplay between governmental and non-governmental actors at a variety of levels. 
Similarly, a ‘street-level bureaucracy’ approach to implementation suggests that although 
legislation is made at the ‘top’, it is influenced heavily by the public sector professions 
(teachers, doctors, police officers, judges, welfare officers) who deliver it.  Policy is 
effectively made by street-level bureaucrats at the ‘bottom’ when dealing with their clients.  
Since they are subject to an immense range of (often unclear) requirements laid down by 
regulations at the top, they are powerless to implement them all successfully.    Instead, they 
establish routines to satisfy a proportion of central government objectives while preserving a 
sense of professional autonomy (Lipsky, 1980).   
Further, the UK shares with other systems the same basic interplay between power and ideas.  
The use of ideas performs two main functions.  First, they can be used to undermine policy 
change.  Policymakers establish a language and set of policy assumptions that excludes most 
participants – representing, for example, a paradigm in new institutionalism (Hall, 1993: 279) 
or a policy monopoly in the study of group-government relations (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2009).  Second, they can be used to challenge the status quo.  Much of the literature focuses 
on radical change: paradigmatic, ‘third order’ change occurs when existing ideas are 
associated with profound policy failures, producing a shift in power that displaces existing 
policymakers and/ or causes current experts to fall out of favour, causing a complete shift in 
the way that policy is understood and made within government (Hall, 1993: 287); policy 
punctuations occur when new and significant ideas are adopted, sweeping aside existing 
policy monopolies (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 237); major change follows a ‘window of 
opportunity’ and the coming together of three streams – a policy problem attracts attention, 
the right solution is available, and policymakers have the motive and opportunity to adopt it 
(Kingdon, 1984; Liberman, 2002); or, it follows a ‘shock’ to a policy subsystem, causing the 
dominant coalition to engage in a fundamental rethink of its ideas or the minority coalition to 
exploit its position to gain a more prominent role (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible 
et al, 2009).  We may also identify ‘incremental change with transformative results’ (Streek 
and Thelen, 2005: 8-9).  Ideas or shared beliefs may become ‘institutionalised’ - taken for 
granted and accepted as the starting point when we consider policy problems, but not as fixed 
structures (Blyth, 2002: vii-viii; Hay, 2006: 65).  Instead, they are ‘constantly in flux, being 
reconsidered and redefined as actors communicate and debate with one another’ (Béland and 
Cox, 2010: 4; see also Schmidt, 2006: 113; 2010: 3).  In either case, Rose’s point still applies 
– a change, by government ministers, to the way that policy is understood within some 
British policy communities suggests that most will escape their attention.  As in other 
political systems, punctuations and third order change are rare, regardless of the form of 
democracy, concentration of power and willingness by ministers to take strong and decisive 
action.     
Comparing British and Scottish Politics  
In this light, a comparison with Scottish politics provides two immediate lessons: do not read 
off behaviour directly from institutions (these apparently different systems operate in similar 
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ways) and do not expect too much policy and institutional change in short time periods (since 
elements of continuity can still be found in Scotland, 12 years on).    
These lessons can be derived from a comparison of UK and Scottish policy styles.  The new 
Scottish Parliament was sold as the alternative to the politics of ‘old Westminster’.  The plans 
were very much in the Lijphart consensus democracy mould:  a proportional electoral system, 
to share power between parties and encourage coalition building, and the widening of 
participation with groups to foster cooperation and resist the temptation to internalise policy 
formulation (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 13).  Yet, the broad-picture evidence on this new 
comparator is very similar to the UK/ other European countries comparison.  On the one 
hand, there is evidence that devolution opened up the consultation process for pressure 
participants, with groups reporting high levels of satisfaction when engaging with 
government (Cairney, 2008; Keating et al., 2009). The process is ‘open and consultative’ and 
groups point to the ease of access, with civil servants (and often ministers) a ‘phone call 
away’ (see McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 236).  On the other, there is evidence to suggest 
that similar processes still operate in London; a similar logic of consultation still exists across 
the UK (Cairney, 2008).    
This mixed picture is reinforced if we analyse specific case studies.  For example, the process 
associated with the UK Mental Health Bill from the late 1990s confirms the caricature of the 
top-down UK government and contrasts markedly with a consensual style in Scotland.  The 
UK Government presided over a ten year stand-off with groups, followed by limited 
legislation (just enough to be ECHR compliant);
ii
 the Scottish Government oversaw a two 
year consultation process that produced consensus and extensive legislation.  Yet, further 
investigation reveals that a series of factors effectively had to be in place (perhaps like the 
coming together of streams in Kingdon’s analysis) to cause what is really a departure from 
the ‘normal’ British style.  In the absence of these factors, policymaking returned to the 
normal style which was very similar to that found in Scotland.    Indeed, there is something 
impressive about the UK government’s ability to compartmentalise issues to retain this style; 
this close consultation on most other issues was maintained largely with the same groups 
(Cairney, 2009a: 364).  Few, if any, studies go beyond anecdotal evidence or very specific 
‘headline’ examples to suggest a systematic difference in the consultation practices of the 
majoritarian UK and consensus Scotland (instead, consultation practices may be as likely to 
vary by policy issue or over time - Cairney, 2008: 364).  Further, few studies show that the 
UK government suffers greater problems of implementation following opposition from 
interest groups; if anything, groups in devolved territories are less happy with the final 
outcome (2009a: 356).  
Indeed, if devolution to Scotland (itself a challenge to the idea of a British political tradition) 
has showed us anything it is that the British policy style extends to intergovernmental 
relations.  Like consultation with groups, IGR has largely been informal, quiet and between 
executives rather than formal and in the public and parliamentary eye.  This setup reflects a 
similar logic to policymaking in which top-down policymaking is problematic, politically 
expensive and generally unnecessary.  Instead, executives have sought ways to cooperate, 
much in the same way that governments form close relationships with groups: portraying the 
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system of deciding Scottish public expenditure as technical and automatic (using the ‘Barnett 
formula’); passing Sewel motions that give Westminster permission to legislate on behalf of 
the Scottish Parliament; and, generally avoiding the use of formal mechanisms such as joint 
ministerial committees.  This relationship has continued (albeit in a modified form) following 
the election of the SNP in 2007 and UK coalition in 2010.     
These lessons can also be derived from analysis of coalition and minority governments.  
‘Power sharing’ between the executive, legislature and the public was a key, albeit vague, 
slogan in the run up to devolution (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995; and there was 
an expectation for the ‘Executive to govern’ - Scottish Office 1998; McGarvey and Cairney, 
2008: 90).  Consequently, the Scottish Parliament was set up as a hub for popular 
participation (including a new public petitions process) and vested with an unusual range of 
powers (when compared to other West European legislatures): the fusion of standing and 
select committee functions, to enable members scrutinising legislation to develop subject 
based expertise; the ability of select committees to call witnesses and oblige ministers and 
civil servants to attend; and, the ability to hold agenda-setting inquiries and to initiate 
legislation if dissatisfied with the government response.  Committees were also charged with 
performing two new roles to ‘front-load’ the legislative process and make up for the fact that, 
in the absence of the House of Lords, there would be no revising chamber.  First, they would 
have a formal pre-legislative role, charged with making sure that the government consults 
adequately with its population before presenting legislation to parliament (a power perhaps 
used twice in 10 years - McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 91; 104).  Second, they would 
consider both the principles of legislation and specific amendments to bills before they were 
discussed in plenary.  All of this took place within the context of an electoral system likely to 
produce coalition government (and hence cooperation between at least two parties) or 
minority government (with a single party perhaps obliged to cooperate with multiple parties). 
Yet, the Scottish experience has shown that these institutional innovations had a limited 
effect on the executive-legislative relationship.  The first eight years of devolution were 
marked by a form of majoritarian coalition government that would not seem out of place in 
the UK.  The coalition dominated a punishing legislative schedule, producing the sense in 
which committees became part of a ‘legislative sausage machine’ rather than powerful bodies 
able to set the agenda through the inquiry process (Arter, 2002: 105).  While there is some 
evidence of parliamentary influence during the scrutiny of government legislation (Shephard 
and Cairney, 2005), the coalition produced and amended the majority of bills (McGarvey and 
Cairney, 2008: 106; reinforcing the rule of thumb by Olson, in Arter, 2006: 250, that the 
executives initiate 90% of legislation and get 90% of what they want).    The Scottish 
Parliament and its committees enjoyed neither the resources to scrutinise government policy 
effectively nor the stability or independence necessary to assert their new powers.  Further, 
although members and committees have the ability to initiate legislation, the same rules 
apply: members are constrained by party affiliation and limited resources, while committees 
rarely find the time or inclination to legislate.  Therefore, after a honeymoon period in the 
first parliamentary session, the Scottish Parliament produced a level of non-executive 
10 
 
legislation comparable in number and scope with Westminster (McGarvey and Cairney, 
2008: 103).  The effects of the new institutions and relationships were thin on the ground.   
This relationship continued from 2007, when the SNP formed a minority government.  There 
were notable differences in approach, such as the decision not to introduce legislation (on 
issues such as constitutional change and the local income tax) for which the Scottish 
Government had insufficient support, and many more instances in which it lost parliamentary 
votes (most related to non-binding motions).  However, the Scottish Government has also 
found that it can pursue most policy decisions with recourse to some new legislation, its use 
of the existing law, a distribution of funding, and its relationships with other bodies such as 
local authorities.  Most notably, it still enjoys the imbalance of resources between executive 
and legislature; the Scottish Parliament is unable to fill the legislative gap and its ability to 
scrutinise government policy is still limited by a lack of resources (and reliance on the 
Scottish Government for most of its information).   
Conclusion 
Despite their institutional differences, and traditions, the UK and Scottish Governments do 
not operate in a radically different way.  The new Scottish policy style was a movement away 
from a UK setup that didn’t exist and any hopes for a radically new executive-legislative 
relationship have never been realised.  In turn, the UK government cannot move from 
something that doesn’t or won’t exist: its relationships with the outside world and Parliament 
will not change radically.   The level of continuity in both systems, and the lack of difference 
between them, is significant, reflecting the common constraints that political systems face.  
The UK shares with other countries a set of policy conditions that are universal rather than 
tied to specific traditions, political systems or periods of time.  Resources and power are 
concentrated in the executive (when compared to the legislature), but also devolved and 
dispersed to other arenas because boundedly rational policymakers cannot personally control 
large political systems or, indeed, pay attention to more than a small fraction of their 
responsibilities.  We should be careful not to forget the level of continuity that this setup 
causes within all political systems even during the most exciting times.  We should not 
assume that the UK government will be relatively willing and able to preside over more 
radical change than its European or devolved neighbours just because it is ostensibly a 
majoritarian system and ministers are expected to take charge of hard decisions.  Instead, we 
should study the longer term processes that occur beyond the headlines (and remember that 
long periods of incremental change punctuated by bursts of change, in some areas, is a 
universal theme).   
Of course, there is a danger of going too far; of appearing to reject the scope for unusual 
degrees of change during particular eras or crises.  Such an argument would be difficult to 
support during this period of economic retrenchment prompted by an economic crisis and a 
government willing to exploit it; to use it as a powerful frame when making unpopular 
choices.    Instead, the article merely encourages us not to assume that such major policy 
choices will be carried out as fully intended or to the degree that is currently advertised.   
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It would be equally difficult to deny all aspects of UK distinctiveness when there are clear 
UK/ Scottish differences.   For our purposes, the most relevant difference is Scotland’s size 
and the perceived relative need for its government to centralise policymaking to ensure an 
adequate degree of accountability (ultimately to Parliament).  There are moves in both 
systems to decentralise: in the UK it may be marked by the ‘Big Society’ idea in which 
individuals and local groups are given the power to deliver services; in Scotland it is marked 
by the devolution of responsibilities to local authorities.  In both cases, the move is 
incremental: in the UK, it may merely reinforce non-government service delivery; in 
Scotland it reinforces an existing degree of local autonomy; in both, it extends the devolution 
of power and responsibility that already takes place.  The key difference may be in levels of 
the tolerance of autonomy.  In Scotland it is relatively easy (and advantageous, given its low 
civil service size and policy capacity) to maintain oversight through partnerships in which 
there is a meaningful degree of personal contact (largely between civil servants and other 
actors).  In the UK, there is a greater need for relatively impersonal mechanisms of control, 
creating the irony that the more you let go the more you regulate.  However, Scotland can 
provide some lessons because they share two things in common.  The first is an imbalance of 
power between government and Parliament.  The Scottish approach has produced some 
casualties, such as when Fiona Hyslop lost her job as Education Secretary when local 
authorities did not use their funding to harmonise class sizes.  However, on the whole, the 
Scottish Parliament does not possess the resources to keep up with, and advertise any 
perceived failings of, the process of decentralisation and the move to ‘single outcome 
agreements’ as a long term evaluation of government progress.  Second, there has to be a 
political payoff to decentralisation.  In Scotland, there were many: the desire to present an 
image of governing competence (getting councils on side when Labour could not); the pursuit 
of a council tax freeze before introducing a local income tax; and, the added bonus of 
shuffling off responsibility for funding crises in local government (as in Aberdeen City in 
2008).  There do not seem to be the same payoff in London for the Big Society.   Perhaps, in 
this case, there is a bigger payoff in exploiting the image of strong decisive ministers so 
entrenched in the British political tradition.   
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i
 The article uses ‘British politics’ and ‘British policy style’ to refer primarily to politics and policy regarding the 
UK Government.   
ii
 Perhaps confirming the willingness of ministers to make unpopular decisions, but not their ability to get their 
own way.   
